of rock music, asking if the reason it is held in lower esteem by some is that its artworks have been misunderstood to be of the same kind as classical musical works. In classical music, the production of the sound event that the audience listens to is the result of two quite distinct groups of actions. First the composer creates the work, by writing a score.
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Then a performing artist or group of artists performs the work, of necessity producing an interpretation of it. 1 Often the composer is closely involved in at least the first performance of a new work, but even then her contributions as a composer are clearly distinguishable from those she makes as a performer. Shortly after the Second World War, some classical composers began focusing on producing works that did not require any performance. Using technology developed to record and reproduce the sounds of 2 performances, they began creating tapes that when played back produced sound events that could not be considered an accurate record of any performance occurring in the studio, in any sense. Any authentic copy of the master tape produced an authentic instance of the work when played back. 2 In such 'electronic music', the sound of the work, in an important sense, came straight from the composer, without the mediation of a performing artist. The end of traditional compositional techniques was solemnly predicted. In fact, in the classical tradition, electronic music remains a minority culture. It was a different musical tradition that took up the recording studio as its workshop.
I. TWO COMPETING ONTOLOGIES OF ROCK
In the first book-length philosophical aesthetics of rock, Theodore Gracyk argues that rock music is the tradition that has cut out the performing middleman, and delivers music straight from the composer to the audience. 3 Although he resists the temptation to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for being a rock work, Gracyk does say that he is talking about rock music in a broad sense: not as a style (rock as opposed to heavy metal), but as a wider artistic tradition (rock as opposed to classical or jazz). He comes close to providing a definition when he says that "rock is popular music of the second half of the twentieth century which is essentially dependent on recording technology for its inception and dissemination". 4 He argues for this conception by providing a history of the tradition beginning with Elvis Presley's early recordings at Sun Studios, and hitting its stride with Bob Dylan's first electric albums and the Beatles' shift of focus from live shows to the recording studio. 5 The ontological thesis that Gracyk develops through the first half of his book is that the primary work of art in rock music is not a 'thin' sound structure to be instanced in different performances, as in classical music, but the almost 3 maximally 'thick' sound structure encoded on a recording and properly instanced through playback of a copy of the recording. 6 In his recent book on musical ontology, Musical Works and Performances,
Stephen Davies criticizes Gracyk's view, pointing to important rock practices that Gracyk ignores or sidelines, particularly the importance placed on live performance skill in the rock world. 7 In summary, Davies says
[t]he facts are these: more groups play rock music than ever are recorded; almost every recorded group began as a garage band that relied on live gigs; almost every famous recording artist is also an accomplished stage performer; [and] although record producers are quite rightly acknowledged for the importance of their contribution, they are not usually identified as members of the band… 8 Elsewhere he also points to the fact that cover versions and remixes are treated more like new interpretations of existing works -more like performances -than like new works in their own right. 9 Davies proposes an alternative account of rock ontology intended to correct these shortcomings. He argues that rock works, like classical ones, are created for performance, but whereas classical works are for live performance, rock works are for studio performance, where works for studio performance implicitly include a part for producer and sound engineers. 10 It is important to note that Davies's claim is not that there are classical works and rock works, of some common ontological kind, and that the classical ones are intended for a certain sort of performance, while the rock ones are intended for a different kind of performance. The claim is that classical works are of the ontological kind work-for-live-performance, while rock works are of a different ontological kind: work-for-studio-performance.
While I am sympathetic with Davies's reclamation of the importance of live performance skill for rock, I believe we can find a place for such values in rock without recourse to the notion of a work-for-studio-performance. 11 Several of the problems with
Davies's account of rock come from a tension between the idea of rock works' being forstudio-performance and the very rock practices he highlights in his criticisms of Gracyk.
First, although many garage and pub bands may hope to be recorded one day, it is not clear that they write their songs with a part for sound engineer even implicitly in mind. When playing in the garage or pub, without those technicians, these bands seem to think they are providing audiences with fully authentic performances of their songs, not with performances missing a part. 12 Of course, even pub bands use amplification, so one might argue that the role of engineer is being played by someone, even if that someone is the bass-player who also does the sound-check at the beginning of the gig. But this much engineering is merely the result of using electric instruments. Live performances of classical works involving electric instruments, from Anthony Ritchie's concerto for amplified acoustic guitar (referred to by Davies), through the weird innovations of the early twentieth century such as the theremin and ondes martenot, to the wind machine in Vaughan Williams's Sinfonia antartica, require an engineer one way or another. 13 That does not make those engineers performers of the works (despite there being an 'implicit part' for an engineer to 'play'); nor does it make those works ontologically for-studioperformance. Moreover, as Davies says in the quotation above, in rock music, producers and engineers are not identified as members of the band.
Second, Davies maintains both that rock songs are works for studio performance,
and that "works for studio performance…cannot usually be played live". 14 Any account 5 of rock music that makes live concerts an unusual phenomenon is surely misguided. At rock concerts, even by bands that have produced studio albums, neither the musicians nor the audiences suppose that those bands do not simply perform their songs. This intuition is admittedly defeasible in the face of a theory with more explanatory power, but Davies thinks that his account fits our intuitions about live rock better than mine (to be outlined below). 15 This cannot be so if it virtually rules out live rock shows.
Davies has suggested (in private communication) that rock musicians and fans might be acquiescing in the inferior simulations of recordings that go on at rock concerts simply as the result of contingent current technological shortcomings. More and more equipment is making the move from the recording studio to the stage, as its size decreases and its flexibility increases. Perhaps one day all that is achievable in the studio will be achievable onstage. At that point there will be no reason to withhold the label 'studio performance' from 'live' rock concerts.
There are three relevant responses to this suggestion. First, as noted above, although rock musicians may use on stage some of the same technology they use in the studio to produce the same sounds, they are still expected to perform their songs. There is already technology available to reproduce the sound of a recording on stage -your home CD-player and amplifier will do that. But rock audiences want to hear musicians play their instruments and sing, just as do classical and jazz audiences, as the occasional lipsyncing scandal shows. 16 Second, when performers do attempt to emulate the sound of a studio recording, Davies is conflating these two senses of 'studio performance', then the usefulness of his proposed ontological category (work for-studio-performance) is thrown into question. 21 In my positive account below, I find different uses for both the process and product senses of Davies's conception of 'studio performance'. Since the product sense simply refers to the track or recording, I will not use the term 'studio performance' in that sense.
Nor will I use the term in the process sense for traditions, such as classical electronic music and (I argue) rock, where the process of creating the recording is not usefully conceived of as a performance. Only in classical music (and relevantly similar traditions)
is the process of creating a recording usefully thought of as a performance, and thus only in those traditions will I refer to the process of producing a recording as a performance, Of course, these thought-experiments drastically oversimplify matters, leaving out untold possible developments in the two traditions I discuss that might result from the radical changes in their environments, and more importantly, the effects of their long 9 histories on what would happen given these unlikely changes. But rather than consider them hopelessly speculative as a result, I would rather they be taken as parables. For surely the morals I draw from them are reasonable claims about the traditions as they now stand. Classical music is primarily, as it has always been, a live performance tradition, and its recordings assimilate themselves to that tradition. Rock music is primarily a recording tradition, and its live performances depend partly on that tradition for their value. Thus, live rock performances, while undeniably an important part of the rock world, are not the primary focus of critical attention in that tradition.
II. TRACKS THAT MANIFEST SONGS: A SYNTHETIC VIEW
What position is available, then, to someone who sympathizes both with Gracyk's arguments that the primary work in rock music is the ontologically thick recording, but also with Davies's counter-arguments that rock is importantly a performance art, like classical music? I think that Davies is right in seeing rock songs -the very thin structures of melody, harmony, and lyrics -as pieces of music that may be performed, that is, instanced in live performances. But these pieces of music are not the, or even a, primary focus of critical attention in rock, and thus are not musical works. 22 Given their thinness, and their creators' awareness that they may be both performed live and used in the construction of tracks, I think it is wrong to consider these pieces of music, these sound structures, ontologically for anything in particular, be it performance simpliciter, or a particular kind of performance. Gracyk, on the other hand, is right in seeing rock tracksthe recordings that rock musicians create on the basis of, or more often along with, their songs -as musical works in their own right -the kind of thing that is the primary focus of critical attention in rock.
The view I defend is this: Rock musicians primarily construct tracks. These are ontologically thick works, like classical electronic works, and are at the center of rock as an art form. However, these tracks also manifest songs. Rock songs, like jazz songs, but unlike classical songs, tend to be very thin ontologically, allowing of alterations in instrumentation, lyrics, melody, and even harmony. But while classical and jazz songs are works for performance simpliciter, rock songs are not works, nor are they for anything in particular. Rock tracks are not special kinds of performances of the thin songs they manifest, as Davies would have it. Rather, they are studio constructions: thick works that manifest thin songs, without being performances of them.
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I draw on Gracyk's terminology in talking of rock tracks 'manifesting' songs without being performances of them. 24 Davies criticizes this talk as "awkward and obscure", 25 since if something is of a kind for performance, fully authentic instances of that thing must be performances. 26 I have argued that rock songs are not for performance. of an ontological kind for performance. In that case, it would seem, if a recording authentically instances a rock song, the recording must be a performance of some sort.
But one person's modus ponens is another's modus tollens. I would argue in that case that in rock the recording does not authentically instance the song for performance, but rather
The concept of manifesting a work (or non-work object, such as a rock song) is supposed to be intermediate between that of authentically instancing a work and that of having no relation to it. A manifestation of a work represents the work, displaying many of its properties, without necessarily being an instance of it. A few examples should illustrate the idea. One might say that a photograph of the Mona Lisa in an art-history book manifests that work by being an accurate photograph of the painting. But it cannot be an authentic instance of the painting, since oil paintings are singular works -they have only one 'instance', the original. One might say that a classical score manifests the work it is of. Anyone working within the classical tradition can 'read off' the score every element of the work's sound structure. Indeed, it is often easier to extract the work from a manifestation (for example, a score) than an instance (that is, a performance). Even someone well versed in contemporary classical music might not be able to tell, say, how many, and which, of the notes one hears in a performance of a contemporary piece are work-determinative rather than the result of a requirement in the score to improvise, or engage in some aleatoric procedure. But this will be clear in the score. Yet scores are not authentic instances of classical works, because they are not performances. In my view, rock tracks bear the manifestation relation to rock songs. Someone knowledgeable in the tradition can 'read off' a track the song that is manifested by it. But the track is not thereby a performance of the song. Unlike in the classical case, however, since the rock song is a sound structure, but not for-performance, the track manifests the song by instancing it, while the sheet music of the song might manifest it, but could not instance it.
Why not simply use the term 'representation' instead of 'manifestation'? Partly because 'representation' brings along with it connotations of interpretation, making rock tracks look more like interpretations, and thus performances, of songs. This is not merely a rhetorical move, however, since, as the preceding examples make clear, we have such a notion of manifestation without performance, or interpretation, or representation in this thick sense.
On the other hand, there is something to Davies's notion of a 'virtual performance'. When we listen to a recording, whether rock or classical, we do think of it in some way as continuously caused, to the extent that we experience it as a phenomenal whole. 27 However, this does not require us to believe that all recordings are the result of performances of some sort. 28 Davies must agree, because he does not think classical electronic works are works for studio performance, though they provide a unified phenomenal experience. I am arguing that the situation is the same in rock.
Someone might argue that I am willfully ignoring the important role of performance skill in the production of rock recordings. After all, respect for, and valorization of, the ability to sing and play instruments -particularly electric guitar, bass, and drums -seems just as central in the rock world as the same respect for instrumental skill in the classical world. even the leaders of these schools had come to see that these different modes of production were "twin facets of one genre". 30 That is, I would say, they had come to realize that they were producing the same kind of artwork in two different ways, as two sculptors might differ in their preference for marble or granite. Now, as in the sculpture case, the different means of production of this kind of work might be aesthetically 
III. LIVE ROCK PERFORMANCES
Davies criticizes my view on this account, calling it "unacceptably schizoid". 32 His view of rock is more unified, in that the same artwork is at the center of both the recorded and live rock worlds -the song-for-studio-performance. On the other hand, more radical departures from the sound on a band's studio recordings are possible live. This often happens with older material, and thus can be seen to some extent as a result of boredom, or, considered more positively, as springing from a desire to explore as yet untapped potential in a song. (But note that it is extremely uncommon for a band to record a new studio version of the same song -to cover their own tracks, as it were. 36 ) Often, also, a song can be performed in an extremely simple fashion, being sung to the sole accompaniment of an (amplified) acoustic guitar. An example is Radiohead's 'True Love Waits', 37 notable for being just such a simple performance, but at a concert by a studio band par excellence. 38 These considerations suggest that Davies is wrong to view live rock performances as simulations of the recordings of the bands performing, even when they are established studio artists. My view, that live rock shows consist of performances of thin songs, while studio recordings are electronic works in their own right, is admittedly dichotomous, but its dichotomy reflects rock practice, and thus, contra Davies, is not fairly characterized as "schizoid".
IV. COVER VERSIONS
A prima facie question for my view is: What makes one rock track a 'cover', or new version, of some previous track, if it is not some kind of performance of the song 'covered'? 39 Gracyk does not have much to say on the topic of covers. 40 He discusses different versions of a track such as the CD re-release of an originally vinyl track, alternative cuts, and remixes, but does not talk about recordings of the same song by different artists. On Davies's view, the rock case parallels the classical: a recording is an authentic (studio) performance of a particular song iff the necessary conditions for (studio) performance of a work are met: " (1) [T]he performance matches the work's content, more or less; (2) the performers intend to follow most of the instructions specifying the work, whoever wrote them; and (3) a robust causal chain runs from the performance to the work's creation". 41 Since I argue that a rock track is not a performance of the song it manifests, I cannot group covers together as different studio performances of the same song. But since I have defended the notion of a track's manifesting a song, I can just as easily group covers together as tracks (successfully) intended to manifest the same song.
Davies would doubtless respond that rock musicians and fans talk of covers as if they are new performances of old songs. But a comparison with film is helpful here.
Films occasionally get 'remade': a new film is produced that shares many important properties with a pre-existing film. The plot, the way the plot is presented, and the title are the most commonly transferred properties. But much can be altered. The action can be moved from the Midlands to the Midwest, from the '60s to the '90s, the dialogue can be completely rewritten, so long as it presents broadly the same story. Now, audiences, of course, compare the original and the remake. 43 Directors, knowing this, insert into remakes (or sometimes lard them with) subtle references to the original -a cameo by the aged star of the original, the theme song from the original used intradiegetically, and so on. But there is an important difference between comparisons of an original film with its remake, and comparisons of two performances of a symphony, for instance. When one performance is preferred over another for, say, its sensitive handling of tempo changes in a certain section, the two are being compared as performances, or presentations, of the same work. One listener might agree with another that, in itself, the first performance of the section is more exciting, but that ultimately the second is truer to the work as a whole. But similar judgments are not made in the comparison of an original film and a remake. Two critics might disagree about whether the chase scene in the remake is more exciting, or better edited, than the parallel sequence in the original. One might grant that although the original chase scene is less exciting in itself, it is better suited to the pacing of the movie taken as a whole than the remade chase scene is to the pacing of the remake. But there is no talk of which movie is truer to 'the work' -for there is no obvious referent for this term in cinema, other than a given movie.
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It would be odd to say the remake is a better representation of the script or screenplay for several reasons. First, we are not used to thinking of scripts as works in their own rights, to be 'performed' or instantiated in various ways by various sets of directors, actors, designers, cinematographers, etc. Second, even when an 'original' movie is being made, the script is an extremely fluid entity -it can be, and is frequently, changed (that is, ignored) in accord with how the director (typically) wants the resulting film to look. Third, when a movie is being remade, it is not the original script the director or writers turn to (though this may, of course, be one source they use). Rather, it is the original movie.
Of course, the remakers do not attempt to make a visual doppelgänger of the original. Instead, it is customary to take over, adapting where necessary, those basic structural elements I listed above: the plot (story, histoire, fabula) and the way the plot is presented (discourse, récit, syuzhet), though, as we also noted above, even these can be altered in quite major ways. Let us call this thin structure of plot-plus-way-of-presentingit, the 'narrative', for want of a better term. Clearly the narrative is a better candidate than the script for the 'work' 'performed' in both the original and remade films. The original and remake rarely have the same script in common, while the narrative is, virtually by definition, the abstractum they share. The narrative is what filmmakers and viewers recognize as that which must be preserved in order for one film to count as a remake of another. But none of this implies that the two films are usefully viewed as performances, of any sort, of the narrative they have in common. 44 One can speculate on the reasons why this is so -the narrative is so slight a structure, admitting of such various 
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A final point worth noting, having focused for so long on film remakes and rock covers, is that remakes and covers are quite uncommon in the worlds of cinema and rock.
Almost all films and tracks released are original material. This further suggests, I would argue, that rock, like film, should not be seen as a performance tradition like classical music. 46 It might be countered that it is unfair to compare, in this respect, rock music and 22 film, two art traditions very much alive, with classical music, which is arguably an enfeebled if not quite dead tradition. Even if one were not to go that far, the fact that classical music has hundreds of years' more history to draw on than rock or film might suggest that there would be more recycling of material in the classical world.
But such an objection betrays a superficial understanding of the traditions under discussion. Even if in Beethoven's milieu one might have encountered more works that were new to one, even more premières on the average concert program than one would in the classical world today, nonetheless everyone in the audience would have understood that the performance they were hearing was of a work that was intended to receive 
V. GOODMAN'S ZIG-ZAG REDIVIVUS?
My proposal that covers should be grouped together as tracks successfully intended to manifest the same song may disinter an old musical-aesthetics chestnut that most people believe has been successfully put to rest. I refer to the 'wrong-note paradox' that arises from the notorious constraints Nelson Goodman places on the relations between traditional classical scores and performances. The zig-zag ballet is successfully choreographed when "[i]dentity of work and of score is retained in any series of steps, each of them either from compliant performance to scoreinscription, or from score-inscription to compliant performance, or from score-inscription to true copy". 50 The danger of allowing more freedom in the dance is made clear by
Goodman:
The innocent-seeming principle that performances differing by just one note are instances of the same work risks the consequence -in view of the transitivity of identity -that all performances whatsoever are of the same work. If we allow the least deviation, all assurance of work-preservation and score-preservation is lost;
for by a series of one note errors of omission, addition, and modification, we can go all the way from Beethoven's Fifth Symphony to Three Blind Mice. 51 Finally, Goodman reminds us that he is not "quibbling about the proper use of such words as 'notation', 'score', and 'work'. That matters little more than the proper use of a fork. What does matter is that [a score should provide a] means of identifying a work from performance to performance…". 52 Most commentators have found themselves in a dilemma with respect to the application of the principle of charity to Goodman's zig-zag ballet. On the one hand, one 24 can take seriously his eschewing of the ordinary usage of such terms as 'work', 'score', and 'notation', but then one is forced to note that, however interesting the formal apparatus he assembles is in itself, he cannot make any interesting claims about the nature of musical works, scores, and notations. On the other hand, one can read his disclaimers more weakly, whereupon one is forced to criticize his theory as wrongheaded from the start, since his opening claim, that the primary purpose of scores is the identification of works from performance to performance, seems indefensible. Perhaps, then, I should resist precisely this latter part of the thought experimentthe claim that each successive band was successful in their intention to cover the preceding track in the chain. Perhaps if I am to grant that we got from 'Don't Be Cruel'
to 'Pop Goes the Weasel', I must insist that at some point along the chain, some track, say, N, must have failed to manifest its predecessor's (M's) song. One way to do this would be to argue that though the proposed chain of covers is theoretically possible, it would never happen in practice, because rock musicians, like any others, are generally 29 well aware of the history of the tradition within which they are working. Thus N is, in practice, much more likely to be a cover of the original A, or perhaps the well-known F, with an awareness of several other previous versions, than simply a cover of M as if it were the original manifestation of the song in question. In sum, the scenario sketched in setting out the paradox is so unlikely that we needn't worry about it.
Although each of these responses contains some truth, I do not consider any of them satisfying. Given the great differences possible between a cover and its original, a critic of my theory probably does not need to posit a chain of twenty-five covers to make her point. And it is surely not inconceivable that one distinctive cover might be taken alone as the target of another quite transformative cover, and thus that the paradox can be accomplished in a plausible hypothetical scenario. The solution to the paradox does lie in a rejection of the hypothesis that each link in the chain of covers is a successful intention to manifest the song of the target track, but this is due to a more complicated intentional structure than we have so far considered. The covering artist intends his new track to manifest the song manifested on his target track whatever that song is. Because he is knowledgeable about rock practice, he is unlikely to misidentify that song. However, if the target track is a striking cover of a previous track, and moreover the artist is unaware of this fact, we can see how he might fail in his intention. He will fail in the same way that a classical musician intending to perform a very old work might fail. If the score she is playing from has been greatly corrupted through many individually minor copying errors, the classical performer will fail to instance any work at all. She will still produce a musical performance, but it will not be of the work she intends to perform (that which began the causal chain resulting in the score she is playing from), nor of any other work.
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Thus a track may be intended to cover a certain target track, be as similar to that track as many other (successful) covers are to their targets, yet fail to be a cover of its target by failing to manifest the song manifested by that target. 58 As with Goodman's original wrong-note paradox, the striking-cover paradox is the result of over-simplifying the relations between various entities involved in a musical tradition.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The work of art in rock is a track constructed in the studio. 
